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I. INTRODUCTION
In disputed presidential and other elections, what is the appropriate relationship between state law and state institutions versus national law and national institutions? What does the constitutional
law of elections, prior to the 2000 presidential election, tell us about
how that relationship has long been legally understood? This broader
jurisprudence of elections offers a more general, external stance from
which disputes over this relationship surrounding Bush v. Gore can
be helpfully assessed.
Two alternative starting points for defining the national/state legal relationship over elections can readily be identified. One view
would emphasize the importance of the autonomy of state election
law from federal control, whether the election is for state or federal
office. If this view seems surprising when it comes to federal elections—particularly when it comes to elections for the highest national office in the land—it is a surprise that can nonetheless be
rooted in the text of the U.S. Constitution itself. Article II allocates to
the states the power to enact presidential-elector legislation in the
first place. From there it is hardly a large structural leap to infer
that state institutions ought to have the central (perhaps, exclusive)
role in implementing this legislation. That power would, on this view,
necessarily include the lesser power to resolve disputes over the
meaning of such legislation through ordinary state-law processes.
Indeed, the exclusivity or autonomy of state dispute-resolution law
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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might arguably be itself constitutionally enshrined: the very Article
II commitment to state control over presidential-elector selection
might be viewed as uniquely insulating the states from national control in this context. Thus, whether it is the U.S. Congress or the U.S.
Supreme Court that would seek to override state law and state interpretation of state law, Article II might be thought to preclude such
exercises of national power. That result might be considered a
quirky, even dysfunctional remnant of the original constitutional
structure; after all, why should states and state law play such a
dominant role in resolving disputes over presidential elections, given
the transparent national interests at stake? Yet such a result would
be no odder than the Electoral College itself. And just as we must aggregate votes through that institution absent constitutional change,
we might similarly be bound through Article II to acknowledge the
exclusive role of state interpretation of state law in the presidential
election context.
But more than text, originalism, and constitutional structure
might be offered to defend this first view. Contemporary functional
justifications can also be marshaled to support state-law autonomy
even in federal elections; indeed, these functional justifications would
track the values associated more generally with the decentralized
election structure that has long characterized elections in the United
States, even for national office. As James Gardner puts it in his contribution to this symposium, we could imagine that electoral decentralization, including the radical decentralization involved with leaving individual counties even such choices as how to design ballots, is
a structural means of hindering a single set of partisan forces from
gaining unified control over drafting and administering election
rules.1 Even seemingly technical and arcane election rules, we know,
can affect electoral outcomes—particularly when we focus on the cumulative effect of unified control over numerous such rules. On this
view, then, what looks like a chaos of local rules, practices, standards, and structures for resolving national elections becomes a rational, “realist-”inspired means of deploying dramatic decentralization to avoid partisan capture of elections. This functional view
would apply just as much to national elections as to any other. The
first federal judge to address the merits of the Bush campaign’s federal constitutional claims, Judge Middlebrooks, took essentially this
view:
Rather than a sign of weakness or constitutional injury, some solace [concerning Florida’s highly decentralized electoral system]
can be taken in the fact that no one centralized body or person can
1. James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of State Constitutional Structural Constraints in Presidential Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 651-58 (2001).
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control the tabulation of an entire statewide or national election.
For the more county boards and individuals involved in the electoral regulation process, the less likely it becomes that corruption,
bias, or error can influence the ultimate result of an election.2

Corruption can counteract corruption, perhaps, where election regulation and administration is radically decentralized.
The alternative starting point would begin by emphasizing the
constitutional status of the right to vote and the values associated
with that right’s constitutional—hence, national—position. Since
the 1960s, the right to vote, even for state and local offices, has
been recognized to implicate constitutional values of political equality. To constitutionalize the right to vote is, by definition, to nationalize its entailments and safeguards; it is to recognize a constitutional, hence national, interest in uniform, consistent treatment of
certain aspects of voting and political representation. Indeed, constitutional doctrine has been concerned since the 1960s about ensuring protection of the interests secured through “the right to vote”
even in state, local, and yet more narrowly confined elections;3
surely the force of this constitutional right will be not just equally
powerful but at its strongest when it comes to national elections—
particularly elections for the Presidency. Indeed, before Bush v.
Gore, Supreme Court decisions already had recognized distinct national and constitutional interests associated with presidential elections.4 In other words, constitutionalization of the right to vote (and
political rights closely associated with the right to vote), along with
judicial recognition of unique constitutional interests associated
with presidential elections, reflects a fundamental resistance to unqualified endorsement of state autonomy and radical decentralization of the voting process—particularly for national elections. More2. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1052 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1163
(11th Cir. 2000).
3. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying one-vote, oneperson to elections for trustees of local junior college district authority); Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (extending the right to vote to local elections);
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (holding that one-vote, one-person doctrine
applies to elections for local commissioners courts in Texas). In recent years, the Court has
qualified the application of one-vote, one-person to certain special purpose local elections.
See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (rejecting application of one-vote, one-person to
“narrow, special” purpose electoral bodies).
4. Thus, in ballot-access cases, the Court first struck down restrictive laws in the
context of presidential elections. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (sustaining
ballot-access challenge by third-party presidential candidate). Similarly, the Court has limited the power states otherwise have over primary election structures when the states seek
to extend those powers into direct control of national political party conventions. See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (holding unconstitutional state law that
required state-chosen presidential delegates to vote in accord with results of state’s openprimary process, despite National Democratic Party rule requiring that only Party members be able to participate in selection of National Democratic Party’s nominee).
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over, to the extent the “autonomy of state law” view rests on historical pedigree, the entire development of the modern right to vote
jurisprudence rests on a rejection of this history’s authority for contemporary constitutional law.
Undeniable tension thus exists between the role of state and national law in the electoral process. The question is how that tension,
then, is best resolved. More particularly, the specific issue is what
role, if any, federal courts should play in determining whether state
courts, when they interpret state election statutes, have inappropriately made “new law”—in presidential or other elections. The contributions to this symposium of both Robert Schapiro and James Gardner, two leading authorities on state constitutionalism, press for considerable autonomy of state election law.5 On their view, aspects of
Bush v. Gore reflect an inappropriate “centralization of power in the
national government.”6 This centralizing tendency is most dramatically displayed in the concurring opinion’s dismissal of the Florida
Supreme Court’s reading of state law; that concurrence comes close
to treating the meaning of state presidential-elector laws as itself directly a question of federal law. From the perspective of state constitutionalism, Schapiro and Gardner criticize the dramatic intrusion
into state judicial processes that the concurrence represents.
There is force in this plea for the independence of state law. But
from the perspective of election law, state election-law decisions cannot be wholly free from constitutional oversight; a view that would
make state law completely autonomous would give too little weight,
in my view, to a legitimate constitutional interest in ensuring the integrity of electoral processes. I want to map out a different course for
engaging the tension between state and national institutions; I will
situate Bush v. Gore in the less overwhelming context of more routine electoral disputes and the approach lower federal courts have
taken to those disputes. What emerges from this body of law is, on
the one hand, an acknowledgment of national constitutional interests
in overseeing election disputes and state judicial interpretations of
state election laws. Indeed, this approach is more aggressively “cen-

5. Gardner, supra note 1, at 627; Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 678 (2001).
6. Gardner, supra note 1, at 658. Both papers come from leading authorities on state
constitutionalism, a field that has been identified as worthy of its own study but understudied until recently; Bush v. Gore perhaps will catalyze greater attention to the role of
state constitutions. For other studies of state constitutionalism and the distinct structure
and function of state courts and state constitutions, see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and
the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001),
and Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 131 (1999). On state constitutional law theory, see also
Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271
(1998).
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tralizing” than even the concurrence in Bush v. Gore, for that concurrence would limit federal oversight to the context of presidential elections. In contrast, the approach I identify here finds national constitutional interests implicated even in state and local elections. Yet at
the same time, the approach I identify here is more rule-bound and
circumscribed than that in Bush v. Gore itself. Indeed, by showing
how even the federal courts most committed to aggressive federal
oversight of election disputes have justified and confined their oversight, the singularity of Bush v. Gore—in its view of the relationship
between federal and state law—becomes even more apparent.
II. THE ISSUE DEFINED: CHANGING ELECTION RULES IN THE MIDST
OF ELECTION CONTROVERSIES
Throughout the election litigation, a principal concern on all
sides—and certainly of the United States Supreme Court—was
whether various actors were changing prior Florida law or practice
as specific issues arose: whether to permit a recount at all, for how
long, under what standards, and the like. Although the per curiam’s
resolution did not formally turn on a conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court had improperly changed state law, it is undeniable that
such a concern was a driving force in the Supreme Court majority’s
response to the entire litigation. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring
opinion in Bush v. Gore, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, does,
of course, come down strongly for the view that the Florida Supreme
Court had indeed changed state law in the guise of interpreting it.7
Indeed, so strongly did these three Justices hold this view that they
excoriated the Florida Supreme Court in the most contemptuous
terms: the Florida court’s readings were “absurd,” ones “[n]o reasonable person” would endorse, and “plainly departed from the legislative scheme.”8 Prominent academic defenders of the Court, such as
Richard Posner and Richard Epstein, have also argued that this
view—that the Florida courts had changed state law—provides the
most convincing legal justification for the result in Bush v. Gore.9
Cast in general terms, Judge Posner’s animating principle is one
with which all of us can no doubt agree: “Nothing is more infuriating
than changing the election rules after the outcome of the election,
7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 117-20 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
8. Id. at 118-19.
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME
COURT 13, 21, 35-37 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Electronic Dialogue between Judge Richard A. Posner and Professor Alan M. Dershowitz, The Supreme
Court and the 2000 Election, SLATE, July 2-9, 2001, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=111313
(“The problem at hand is a state court’s intervening to change the result of an election of
the state’s presidential electors by changing the ground rules under which the election was
held.”) (Monday, July 9).
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conducted under the existing rules, is known.”10 Both the concurrence
and these commentators locate the constitutional bar against such
changes in Article II, Section 1.11 This concern about changes in state
law also looms over the per curiam’s alternative equal protection
analysis. The Florida Supreme Court recount order permitted inconsistent treatment between counties regarding what would constitute
an actual vote. This was one of the equal protection violations the
United States Supreme Court found. In addition, the per curiam
found constitutional defects in “the actual process” in which the
manual recount would be undertaken. The Florida courts
did not specify who would recount the ballots. The county canvassing boards were forced to pull together ad hoc teams of judges from
various Circuits who had no previous training in handling and interpreting ballots. Furthermore, while others were permitted to
observe, they were prohibited from objecting during the recount.12

These concerns might doctrinally be best located in the Due Process
Clause, though the per curiam folded them into its equal protection
analysis. But regardless of the doctrinal cubbyhole, the underlying
concern here too is that the recount process would not provide
enough security against the potential manipulation of state law and
practice; in other words, the prospective possibility that rules would
be changed in the middle of the game also formed one grounding for
the per curiam opinion.
Finally, questions at the oral arguments revealed how
tempted certain Justices were to the view that the Florida Supreme
Court had changed state law, even if these Justices ultimately did
not make that view the announced basis for their decision. Justice
O’Connor, for example, twice referred to the “special deference” she
thought state courts might owe state legislatures when interpreting
election statutes in a presidential election, “so as to avoid having the
law changed after the election.”13 Justice Kennedy similarly asked
whether “the Florida legislature [could] have done what the [Florida]
supreme court did” and suggested the answer was no, “because that
would be a new law . . . .”14

10. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 159 (2001).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. This now-famous provision provides that states shall
choose presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct . . . .”
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109.
13. Tr. of Oral Arguments at 7, 43-44, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949)
(Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/00-949.pdf. (An unofficial transcript of the oral arguments in Bush v. Gore revealing the remarks of each individual Justice is available at http://www.npr.org/
news/national/election2000/specials/supremecourt/001211.court.html).
14. Id. at 39-41.
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The concern about “new state law” being made in the context of
election litigation thus played a dominant role in the Supreme
Court’s response to and resolution of the 2000 election. This concern
about changes in state law and practice is both predictable and pervasive in election disputes. Predictable, because in closely disputed
races, each side will accuse those who rule against it of having intentionally changed the rules in order to produce that result—and the
losing side will likely believe its own accusations sincerely. Pervasive, because unless the rules or established state practices are precise and comprehensive in advance, it is likely that gaps will emerge
in the application of those laws to the specifics of any particular election dispute. When these gaps must be resolved in the context of a
pending dispute, rather than ex ante, courts or administrative officials—and those who observe them—will know (or believe they know)
the likely effect on the outcome of closing the legal gap in one way
rather than another. Courts cannot blind themselves to the likely
outcome-influencing effects of their legal rulings; hence the fear that
courts will be motivated by knowledge of those effects will be present
whenever clear consensus on litigated issues is absent—as it often
will be. For strong believers in decentralized decisionmaking over
electoral issues, even in national contests, this concern will not be
enough to justify recognition of a countervailing federal constitutional interest that would guard against the creation of “new law.”
But well before Bush v. Gore, a number of federal courts had recognized exactly such a constitutional interest. Grounding the analysis
in this previously established “law of new law” provides a way of
stepping outside the highly charged context of Bush v. Gore to gain a
more general perspective.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN AVOIDING “NEW LAW”
IN STATE AS WELL AS FEDERAL ELECTION DISPUTES
Broadly cast, the question is this: What substantive reasons, if
any, should be sufficient to justify constitutional oversight of election
disputes, be they state or federal? What exactly are the federal constitutional interests (or, statutory interests, if relevant) in various
aspects of the election process, including in potential disputes that
arise after the election? To what extent does or should the federal interest vary when state offices rather than national offices are at
stake, or when different national offices, with different electoral
processes—such as the House, the Senate, or the Presidency—are involved?
The framework within which this issue is to be considered must
begin with a recognition of this central problem: every dispute about
election processes implicates, by definition, questions involving vot-
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ing and democratic processes. In a colloquial sense, then, every dispute about elections could be said to implicate “the right to vote.”
This is true for state elections as well as federal elections. But if
every dispute implicated “the right to vote” in a constitutional
sense—under the Fourteenth Amendment, for example—then every
issue concerning disputed elections, state or federal, would be transformed into a federal constitutional issue. Federal constitutional law
would then be turned into a detailed election code for both state and
federal elections. This would hardly be unprecedented in democratic
countries. In France, for example, the Constitutional Council (comparable to the U.S. Supreme Court) sits as the election overseer for
all parliamentary elections and has broad administrative powers
over the conduct of local elections—including the resolution of election disputes.15
American legal and political practice, however, has been quite different. Just as the United States Supreme Court has resisted constitutionalizing the vast body of state tort law and has refused to permit the ordinary deprivation of state-law property interests to be
transformed into Fourteenth Amendment issues where state procedures are adequate,16 the federal courts have similarly declined to
transform most issues involving the conduct and resolution of elections into federal constitutional matters. The unique legal architecture of American democracy—a product of the oldest constitutional
design in the world and subsequent legal additions built upon that
original structure—represents a complex interlacing of federal and
state interests in matters of voting, elections, and political participation. Many of the issues involving electoral structures are left to be
resolved at the state level, even when national offices are at stake.
The original Constitution, for example, only specifies voter eligibility
requirements for one national office, the House of Representatives.17
Even here, the federal requirements were designed to be wholly derivative of state-law suffrage requirements. For example, Article I,
Section 2 states that electors for the House of Representatives “shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature.”18 Defining the boundary line, then,
between issues left to be resolved as a matter of state law and issues
that instead implicate distinct federal constitutional interests re15. Noëlle Lenoir, Constitutional Council Review of Presidential Elections in France
and a French Judicial Perspective on Bush v. Gore, in THE LONGEST NIGHT: PERSPECTIVES
AND POLEMICS ON ELECTION 2000 (Arthur Jacobson & Michel Rosenfeld eds., forthcoming
2001-02) (manuscript at 6-7, on file with the Florida State University Law Review).
16. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
17. This structure was modified in 1913 by the Seventeenth Amendment, which mandates direct election for senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII, § 1.
18. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
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quires working out the intricate relationship between federal and
state law that has long structured the American democratic system—
even for national offices.
On the one hand, the courts have recognized several discrete and
specific constitutional interests in the structuring of elections. The
courts recognized most of these interests only beginning in the 1960s,
after Baker v. Carr19 effectively overturned Giles v. Harris20 and endorsed the justiciability of claims involving “political rights.” Thus,
state election districts must comply with the one-vote, one-person
principle. The Constitution also imposes constraints on partisan and
racial design of all election districts.21 In addition, since Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,22 the Court has also held that definitions
of who can participate in what elections, on what terms, are subject
to equal protection and due process review. Similarly, the Constitution imposes constraints on the conditions states can impose upon
candidates seeking to be listed on the ballot.23 So, too, the Constitution’s First Amendment recognizes associational rights that protect
the integrity and autonomy of political parties from certain types of
state regulation.24 State election laws that discriminate on their face
along racial lines have been unconstitutional since the line of cases
that banned “the white primary,”25 and of course election laws that
reflect an impermissible racial or ethnic purpose are unconstitutional
under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.26 Finally, the
most important federal statute that overlays state elections, the Voting Rights Act,27 prohibits electoral structures and practices whose
purpose or effect is to dilute the voting power of certain statutorily
protected groups.28 These provide most of the specific, targeted federal interests in election processes, both state and federal.
On the other hand, if there were a more generalized constitutional
interest in ensuring “the integrity of the electoral process” or in securing “fundamental fairness” in elections, then every dispute over
19. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
20. 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (holding that claims of “political rights” were not justiciable).
For the history of Giles and its influence on subsequent constitutional law, see Richard H.
Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000).
21. On partisan constraints, see Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); on racial
constraints, see Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
22. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
23. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (sustaining ballot access challenge by
third-party presidential candidate).
24. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-74 (2000).
25. These cases start with Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), and end nearly
thirty years later with Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
26. The most recent application of this principle, in the Fifteenth Amendment context, is Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
28. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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the running of elections would indeed be subject to potential federal
oversight and control. To avoid this prospect, federal courts have
sought to delineate the distinction between specific, well-defined federal interests in the conduct of elections and the array of other issues
that might be disputed; the latter election-related issues have long
been treated as best resolved through the ordinary processes of state
law. Thus, disputes about whether vote counts were in error due to
technological defects are not recognized as implicating federal interests. As the Fifth Circuit acknowledged in an oft-cited case, the failure to count votes adequately, stated abstractly, could easily sound
like a constitutional issue. 29 But the way the American legal structure conventionally gives content to this abstract right requires attending to the functional structure embodied in the Constitution, the
nature of the federal court system, the limits of federal jurisdiction,
and the role of states in election processes. As the late Judge Rubin
put it, in writing for the Fifth Circuit, federal law must
recognize a distinction between state laws and patterns of state action that systematically deny equality in voting, and episodic
events that, despite non-discriminatory laws, may result in the dilution of an individual’s vote. Unlike systematically discriminatory
laws, isolated events that adversely affect individuals are not presumed to be a violation of the equal protection clause. The unlawful administration by state officers of a non-discriminatory state
law, “resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled
to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there
is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.”
. . . If every state election irregularity were considered a federal
constitutional deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate every
state election dispute, and the elaborate state election contest procedures, designed to assure speedy and orderly disposition of the
multitudinous questions that may arise in the electoral process,
would be superseded by a section 1983 gloss. . . . [Constitutional
law does] not authorize federal courts to be state election monitors.30

This is typical of the bulk of federal court opinions. For similar
reasons, federal courts have also held that the mere violation of a
state statute by an election official is not a constitutional violation;
nor are errors and irregularities that can be expected of the electoral
process; nor is improper counting of ballots absent aggravating factors such as fraud or racial discrimination.31
29. Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted).
31. Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 1975). The Court stated that
the work of conducting elections in our society is typically carried on by volunteers and recruits for whom it is at most an avocation and whose experience
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Yet at the same time that courts have resisted constitutionalizing
most aspects of disputed elections, some federal courts have recognized at least one kind of relevant federal interest: an interest in
providing security against state courts or other state actors developing “new law” in the context of resolving election disputes. Changes
in state law or practice, whether through judicial or administrative
action, can reach the point of what these federal courts have called
“patent and fundamental unfairness,”32 enough so that federal constitutional violations arise. Those federal courts that have identified
such an interest, before Bush v. Gore, have done so even when the
election at issue was for state or local office. Thus, these cases have
identified a general constitutional interest, not confined to presidential elections, in the avoidance of “new law.” But these courts have
also cautioned that for a constitutional violation of this sort to arise,
the “situation must go well beyond the ordinary dispute over the
counting and marking of ballots.”33
These cases, therefore, provide a partial rejection, even before
Bush v. Gore, of the position that no federal interest is implicated in
the way state courts interpret their own state election laws—and this
interest is strong enough to apply even when the underlying election
itself is for state office. These cases thus constitute the outer edge of
a new frontier in the application of constitutional law to election disputes. At the same time, the way these courts have approached the
freighted question of when “new law” has in fact been created reveals
an adjudicatory practice that has developed relatively precise criteria
for identifying “new election law.” How the approach of the United
States Supreme Court compares to this approach from the few federal courts previously willing to act in this area is the topic to which I
now turn.

and intelligence vary widely. Given these conditions, errors and irregularities,
including the kind of conduct proved here, are inevitable, and no constitutional
guarantee exists to remedy them. Rather, state election laws must be relied
upon to provide the proper remedy.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding
that despite numerous violations of state election laws, no federal constitutional violation
occurred in absence of racially discriminatory intent behind those violations or racial vote
dilution occurring); Pettengill v. Putnam Co. R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir.
1973) (concluding that federal courts should not become the “arbiter of disputes” which
arise in elections and attempt to “oversee the administrative details of a local election” absent aggravating factors such as denial of the vote on grounds of race or fraudulent interference with a free election by stuffing of the ballot box and holding that there was no federal violation in alleged improper counting of ballots).
32. Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Roe I] (quoting
Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 703 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)).
33. Id.
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IV. IDENTIFYING “NEW LAW”34
The most intriguing finding of an unconstitutional change in state
election law arose out of disputed statewide elections in Alabama in
1994 for the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court and the
State Treasurer. Initially, vote tallies showed an extremely close
race, particularly for Chief Justice, where 200 to 300 votes appeared
to be the margin of victory.35 The Roe litigation, a massive and
lengthy dispute that intertwined the federal and state courts over
many years, arose over 1,000 to 2,000 contested absentee ballots not
counted in the initial returns.36 The critical state-law question was
whether those ballots were illegal and not to be counted because they
were improperly notarized or witnessed. And the further question,
which eventually triggered a federal constitutional decision in the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, was whether the answer
the Alabama state courts gave to that question—whether these absentee ballots should be counted—was itself an answer that was consistent with prior state law and practice on absentee ballots. If not—
if the Alabama courts had changed a clearly established rule of state
law or well-established state practices—did the decision of the state
judicial system then amount to a federal constitutional violation?
What is the federal interest in ensuring consistency and regularity in
state elections, and if such an interest exists, what must be proven to
establish a violation of that interest?
The minuet between state and federal judicial acts in the Roe litigation reveals a lot about the relationship between federal and state
courts also at issue in Bush v. Gore. First, after the results of the disputed election became known, some absentee voters sought an order
from the state circuit court requiring the contested absentee ballots
to be counted.37 That court issued a temporary restraining order that
forced the Secretary of State to wait until the county canvassing officials had included the contested absentee ballots in the vote totals
before certifying the election.38 Second, in response to this decision,
other voters and two candidates sought an injunction in federal district court ordering state officials to disregard the state circuit court’s
order.39 The federal district court found that the state court order
constituted a change in Alabama’s past practice for dealing with ab-

34. Portions of Part IV, describing the procedural posture of the Roe and Griffin cases,
are derived from SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, WHEN
ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at
10-19 (rev. ed. 2001).
35. Roe I, 43 F.3d at 578.
36. The key substantive ruling of this litigation is found in Roe I.
37. Roe I, 43 F.3d at 578.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 579.
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sentee ballots.40 The federal court concluded that compliance with the
state court order would violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and entered a preliminary injunction requiring the Secretary of State to omit the contested absentee ballots
from the certified election results.41
Roe I resulted from the appeal of the district court’s injunction. In
that decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that federal constitutional interests would be implicated if the Alabama courts changed
the state’s practice of handling the contested ballots in issue.42 As
noted above, Roe I concluded that, in extraordinary circumstances,
changes in state law could implicate Fourteenth Amendment principles of “fundamental fairness.”43 In elaborating on why such changes
would do so—such as including the disputed absentee ballots if established state law and practice was to the contrary—the Eleventh
Circuit identified two constitutional values at stake:
First, counting ballots that were not previously counted would dilute the votes of those voters who met the requirements of [state
law] as well as those voters who actually went to the polls on election day. Second, the change in the rules after the election would
have the effect of disenfranchising those who would have voted but
for the inconvenience imposed by the notarization/witness requirement.44

That is, a change in state law that had the effect of including ballots
not previously included under state law would (1) constitute impermissible vote dilution and (2) disenfranchise, in effect, those voters
who, in reliance on the previous rule, had not voted but would have
voted had they known in advance that the rule would be what it now
was under the new state interpretation.
But having established these principles, Roe I did not quickly
jump to a substantive conclusion of its own that the Alabama courts
had indeed violated these principles. Instead,
Roe I . . . accommodated the diverse federal and state interests in
disputed elections in the following way: having established the relevant substantive constitutional principles, Roe I then certified to the
Alabama Supreme Court the central question of state law: did Alabama law make the contested absentee ballots legal or illegal votes?
At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the Secretary of

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
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State not to certify any election results for Chief Justice and Treasurer, the two offices in question.45

In response to the Eleventh Circuit, the Alabama Supreme Court
concluded that the ballots at issue were legal votes under state law.46
The Eleventh Circuit then remanded the proceedings to federal district court for extensive findings of fact on seventeen specific questions posed to determine whether the state courts had in fact
changed preexisting state election laws following the election.47 The
district court found that, before the contested election, Alabama “uniformly” excluded absentee ballots like those contested.48 The Eleventh Circuit subsequently concluded that the district court’s facts
“were stronger in favor of the Roe Class than the prior panel could
have expected” and that a change in state election practices had been
convincingly proven.49 The district court ordered the Secretary of
State to certify the election results for the Chief Justice and State
Treasurer without including the contested absentee ballots. In Roe
III, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this final judgment.50 Thus, the
federal courts ended up holding that a state court interpretation of
state election law changed the preexisting state law to such an extent
that it constituted an impermissible dilution of votes under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Roe litigation finally
concluded almost one full year after the November 1994 election. The
state circuit court’s restraining order was entered on November 17,
1994, nine days after the election. The federal district court’s preliminary injunction was then entered on December 5, 1994. Roe I was
decided January 4, 1995. Roe III, which finally brought the litigation
to a conclusion, was issued on October 13, 1995.
The other significant court of appeals decision on these issues is
Griffin v. Burns,51 a First Circuit decision that provided an important
precedent in Roe I. Griffin involved the primary for a local city council race in Providence, Rhode Island, in which the Secretary of State
concluded that the general election’s absentee and shut-in ballot laws
should also be applied to primaries.52 State officials publicized the
availability of such ballots, which ten percent of primary voters actually used.53 Thomas McCormick won the machine count but lost the
45. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 34, at 10-11; see also Roe I, 43 F.3d
at 583.
46. Roe v. Mobile County Appointment Bd., 676 So. 2d 1206, 1226 (Ala. 1995).
47. Roe v. Alabama, 52 F.3d 300 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 908 (1995)
[hereinafter Roe II].
48. Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Roe III].
49. Id. at 408.
50. Id. at 409.
51. 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 1067.
53. Id.
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total vote when these absentee ballots were included. He challenged
the use of absentee ballots during primary elections and, in a 3 to 2
decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that state law did not
explicitly allow for the use of absentee ballots in primary elections.54
Four days later, the Rhode Island Legislature amended the law to allow for the use of these ballots in primary elections.55 Meanwhile,
Lloyd Griffin, whose victory over McCormick had been reversed by
the state supreme court’s ruling, brought suit in federal district court
(along with voters who had used the uncounted absentee ballots).
The district court found that the state supreme court’s decision violated these voters’ constitutional rights and ordered a new primary
election.56
The First Circuit affirmed.57 On the substantive federal interest,
the First Circuit noted that the Constitution does not require states
to provide for absentee or shut-in voting in primary elections. The
First Circuit, like other federal courts, also cautioned that despite
the constitutional importance of the right to vote, federal courts
tended to intervene in state election disputes only in the most limited
circumstances: where state laws of general applicability are unconstitutional on their face, or where overt racial discrimination was involved.58 In contrast, “garden variety” election irregularities involving election administration errors, malfunctioning voting machines,
and even some claims of official misconduct, do not typically rise to
the level of a constitutional violation, especially where the state provides adequate corrective processes.59 Nonetheless, the First Circuit
concluded that federal intervention was warranted in this context.
The justification for federal intervention was similar to that in
Roe I: where “broad-gauged unfairness permeates an election, even if
derived from apparently neutral action” an election process can reach
a “point of patent and fundamental unfairness” triggering a due
process violation.60 “[D]ue process is implicated where the entire election process—including as part thereof the state’s administrative and
judicial corrective process—fails on its face to afford fundamental

54. Id. at 1068 n.4.
55. Id. at 1068. The amended law was enacted at 1977 R.I. Pub. Laws 153.
56. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1069.
57. Id. at 1079.
58. Id. at 1077.
59. As the First Circuit put it:
If every election irregularity or contested vote involved a federal violation, the
court would “be thrust into the details of virtually every election, tinkering
with the state’s election machinery, reviewing petitions, registration cards, vote
tallies, and certificates of election for all manner of error and insufficiency under state and federal law.”
Id. (citation omitted).
60. Id.
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fairness.”61 Applying this standard, the First Circuit did not hold, as
in Roe I, that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had unconstitutionally changed state law. Instead, the First Circuit compared the state
supreme court’s decision with longstanding prior state practice; with
the advice the relevant state administrative officials provided before
the election; and with the state legislature’s actions both before the
supreme court decision (allowing regular use of such ballots in primaries) and after the decision (amending the law to expressly permit
such ballots in primaries).
Thus the First Circuit concluded that absentee voters had reasonably relied on the advice that they could cast absentee ballots.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision was so unexpected that
excluding these ballots—around ten percent of the total ballots
cast—would violate principles of fundamental fairness embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.62 The voters’ reliance on longstanding state practice was crucial to the decision. Evidence showed that a significant number of voters would have gone to
the polls and voted in person had they known that absentee ballots
were prohibited.63 Because Rhode Island’s Supreme Court had ruled
that these votes were illegal, the First Circuit did not order the votes
to be treated as legally cast.64 Instead, the First Circuit affirmed the
district court’s use of its equitable powers to order a new primary
election.65
The Griffin and Roe cases are the strongest court of appeals decisions that support a constitutional role for federal courts in overseeing potential “new law” that arises in the midst of elections and election disputes. The theory on which these cases rest, as well as the
kind of proof required to establish a violation of their principles, provides a broader framework within which to assess Bush v. Gore.66
V. THE THEORY OF JUDGING “NEW LAW”
The constitutional violation established in Roe explicitly rests on
“two effects” that implicate constitutional due process and equal protection concerns. In addition, I will suggest a third effect that might
be implicit but important in cases like Roe and Griffin. One question
61. Id. at 1078.
62. Id. at 1078-79.
63. Id. at 1080.
64. Id. at 1079.
65. Id. at 1080.
66. A similar framework would explore the general jurisprudence regarding federal
constitutional assessment of state judicial interpretations. Such a framework is provided in
Harold J. Krent, Judging Judging: The Problem of Second-Guessing State Judges’ Interpretation of State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 493 (2001). Krent reaches
similar conclusions as this Article does regarding the singularity of any “new law” basis for
Bush v. Gore.

2001]

JUDGING “NEW LAW”

707

relevant to the “new law” dispute in Bush v. Gore is whether all these
effects or only some of them ought to be required to justify federal rejection of state judicial interpretations.
The first effect centers on a bare change in state election law: the
conclusion of a federal court that a state-court interpretation of state
election laws effectively changes those laws. The second effect focuses
on actual detrimental reliance of state voters on existing state election law before the state court interpretation at issue. Is a “change”
in state law sufficient, in and of itself, to trigger the constitutional
violation? Or must it be a “change” that also frustrates concrete and
specific reliance interests of voters? Note that in the Roe litigation
there was no allegation that state officials had engaged in fraudulent
conduct or acted with partisan intent to manipulate outcomes; the
claim was that even apparently neutral action could amount to unconstitutional unfairness through its effects on the electoral process.
A. Vote Dilution and Changes in State Law
The first effect is unconstitutional vote dilution that occurs when
state election rules change to include votes not previously treated as
legal votes under state law. Those injured would include voters who
went to the polls and cast legal votes or who cast legal absentee
votes; a change in state law that permits previously illegal votes to
be counted then, apparently, dilutes the votes legally cast. Notice
that in the view of the Roe I court, it does not matter whether state
law is being “liberally” interpreted to admit disputed votes or “stringently” interpreted to exclude disputed votes; if state law has been
changed, the constitutional violation occurs. According to Roe I, just
as excluding ballots might deny the right to vote, including ballots
that prior law requires be excluded is vote dilution—a form of ballotbox stuffing—and just as unconstitutional. Some federal courts, in
contrast, conclude that state court rulings which enfranchise voters,
rather than excluding them, should be given much greater deference.
On this view, state rulings enfranchising voters can never amount to
unconstitutional vote dilution, or if they can, the standard for proving that a franchise-expanding ruling is an impermissible change in
state law is higher.67 Roe I rejects this asymmetry, most likely because the constitutional interest is in ensuring the integrity and fun67. In Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Barreto Perez, 639 F.2d 825, 828 (1st. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981), for example, the First Circuit rejected a “new law” argument by noting that the purported ruling would expand, rather than contract, the franchise. But the First Circuit also noted that there had been no detrimental reliance on the
purported prior law, unlike in the First Circuit’s earlier decision in Griffin; hence, the alternative grounds for decision make even Partido Nuevo less than a clear holding that
changes in state election law can never amount to unconstitutional vote dilution if those
changes expand the franchise. Id.
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damental fairness of elections. That integrity can be violated just as
readily by changing state law to add votes as by changing state law
to subtract votes.
Even under this expansive conception of unconstitutional vote dilution, federal courts recognize the need to distinguish between ordinary disputes over counting ballots and state practices that reach the
point of “patent and fundamental unfairness.”68 But suppose a federal court simply disagrees with a state court interpretation of the
state’s election laws, when the consequence of any judicial decision is
to include or exclude certain ballots. If the federal court believes that
state law requires excluding certain ballots, would Roe mean that
unconstitutional vote dilution would occur were the state court to interpret state law differently and conclude that those ballots should
be included? Or, if the state court excludes certain ballots, and the
federal courts believe state law requires inclusion of such ballots, is
this tantamount to unconstitutional vote dilution against voters
whose votes have been excluded? There is a risk, certainly, that the
principle of Roe would turn every dispute over the interpretation of
state election law into a federal constitutional question. How troubling that risk is depends on how strong the evidence must be that a
state court interpretation actually changes existing state law.
The question then becomes how convinced a federal court ought to
be, with what evidentiary basis, that a state judicial decision changes
state election practices enough to amount to a federal constitutional
violation. We can imagine a spectrum of possible contexts. At one
end, the prior state law can be embodied not only in written legal
texts but in longstanding judicial and administrative practices consistent with those texts. The more the specific issue has been regularly confronted, particularly in contexts analogous to that at issue,
the more possible it becomes to have a firmly anchored set of baseline
laws and practices against which federal courts can assess any potential “changes” in state practices. In such a case, a federal court
has a body of well-grounded evidence to draw on in assessing
whether one particular state judicial ruling is a sharp departure
from preexisting state rules.
That was precisely the situation in the Roe litigation. The Eleventh Circuit did not just offer its own free-standing interpretation of
the meaning of Alabama law. Nor did the Eleventh Circuit base its
interpretation solely on the words of a single state statute. Instead,
that court came to judgment only after extensive proceedings to test
the “new law” question in both state and lower federal courts. Most
importantly, the federal district court, after a lengthy trial, had made
the following factual findings: (1) every county in Alabama (except
68. Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995).
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one) had consistently and for years excluded absentee ballots like
those contested; (2) the Secretary of State had consistently maintained that ballots like those contested were not to be counted and
had instructed every voting official in the State to that effect; (3) not
one election official testified to the court that the contested ballots
would ordinarily be included; and (4) had voters known they could
have voted absentee under laxer standards, many more might have
voted.69 In light of this longstanding, unequivocal, consistent state
practice, the district court concluded that the state circuit court’s decision to include the ballots was an “abominable” postelection change
of practice that amounted to unconstitutional “ballot-box stuffing.”70
Now consider the other end of the spectrum. Suppose a state has
an election law on the books that has not been tested or applied with
any frequency (if at all) and hence has not been the subject of extensive judicial or administrative elaboration. Indeed, suppose the statute has never been applied to the type of election currently before the
state courts. When the state courts interpret such a statute in the
midst of this kind of election, what baseline can the federal courts
use to assess whether that state interpretation is a dramatic “change
in state law”? If there is limited or no evidence of actual prior state
practices on the matter, nor even official positions that the Secretary
of State has taken in advance and instructed state officials to follow,
what kind of evidence can the federal court possibly look at to determine whether judicial interpretation has become an “abominable”
postelection change?
In such a situation, the federal courts can hardly do anything
other than second-guess whether the state court has read the statute
the same way the federal court would, if the federal court had the
power to interpret state law itself in the first instance. For virtually
the only evidence the federal court would have before it would be the
text of the state statute itself. Perhaps, in some states, the federal
court would also have whatever legislative history was relevant—
though, as is often the case, the state legislature might have enacted
the statute without any thought at all about its application to the
particular kind of election matter currently at issue. Yet this information, mostly confined to the text of the statute itself, is exactly the
same information before the state court. If the federal court has no
more than the text alone upon which to draw, is there a sufficient
prior established state-law practice that ought to justify the “extraordinary” federal constitutional intervention that is warranted
only when matters of “patent and fundamental unfairness” are involved?
69. Roe v. Mobile County Appointing Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 1995).
70. Id.
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Even federal courts most aggressive in developing the “law of new
law” have continually acknowledged that the task of doctrine in this
area is to distinguish ordinary state election disputes from matters
that warrant the extraordinary intervention of constitutional law because some “abominable” or comparable change in law has turned
the election. Yet if a particular election context can only involve differences in views between state and federal courts over how state
laws ought to be interpreted, where those differences cannot be
grounded in anything other than the words of the particular statute
itself—because there is no longstanding state practice one way or the
other—how readily should federal courts conclude that a constitutional violation has occurred? At this pole of the spectrum of possible
“new law” cases, there is a real danger that federal courts will simply
substitute their own judgment about the proper meaning of state law
rather than ensuring that the state acts consistently with its own
prior laws and practices. This is precisely the intrusion on state interests that the architecture of the “new law” doctrine, taken as a
whole, is designed to guard against. Ensuring meaningful consistency of state election practices is supposed to be the defining constitutional interest that justifies federal oversight, at least through the
general commands of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
B. Detrimental Reliance, Due Process, and Constitutional Violations
Roe I identified not one but two constitutional defects that justified constitutional intervention. The first is vote dilution that can occur from sharp changes in state law, whether they expand or contract the franchise.71 The second effect rests on detrimental reliance
and appears to implicate values of due process rather than the antidilution principle of equally-weighted votes.72 Here the constitutional
question is whether the purportedly “new” state rule—had it been
specified clearly in advance—would have led (or might have led) significant numbers of nonvoters to vote. In other words, the second
constitutional concern is that voters and potential voters acted in reliance on a well-justified belief that state law required or permitted
X, where X is a condition of casting a valid vote. Where X is a required condition of voting, and state institutions conclude after an
election that X was not actually required, voters who would have
voted (or might have voted) had they known X was not required have
had their constitutional rights violated. Similarly, where X is a permitted mode of voting, but state institutions conclude, after ballots
have been cast, that X is not a permitted mode, voters who would
have voted (or might have voted) in some alternative mode have also
71. Roe I, 43 F.3d at 581.
72. Id.
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had their rights violated. In either case, because voters appropriately
relied to their detriment on a well-grounded belief that state law was
X, their due process rights—of fair notice with regard to conditions
on the right to vote—have been violated.
This theory of detrimental reliance as the basis of constitutional
injury was also implicated in Roe I. The disputed state judicial interpretation of Alabama law made it easier for voters to cast absentee
ballots. Thus, according to the Roe I court, the postelection change in
interpretation “disenfranchised” those who would have voted but for
the more onerous absentee ballot restrictions previous state practice
had imposed.73 Because voters notified in advance of the “new rule”
might well have voted, the retroactive adoption of this rule violated
their due process rights. Griffin’s “changed law” holding is grounded
even more strongly in the fact of detrimental reliance. As noted
above, plaintiffs produced evidence that, had they known in advance
that absentee voting would not be permitted, at least some of them
would have gone to the polls.74
Thus, Roe I and Griffin, which stand as examples of federal case
law most willing to find an unconstitutional state creation of “new
law,” involved both vote dilution and detrimental reliance. A key
question about this line of cases is, thus, whether both effects are
necessary to establish this constitutional violation. It is not hard to
imagine a state judicial decision that arguably changes state election
law, but not in a way that could plausibly be said to deny due process
by effectively disenfranchising voters who would otherwise have
voted had they known of the new rule. Under the Roe-Griffin line of
cases, would such a state court interpretation violate the Constitution? Whether either vote dilution or detrimental reliance, standing
alone, is sufficient to establish a violation, or whether both are necessary, had not been resolved in the lower courts at the time of Bush v.
Gore. Yet as we will see, once we identify these two potential justifications, there will be no need to untangle the precise relationship between them in order to assess Bush v. Gore itself through the framework these cases offer.
C. Structural Considerations and Elections: When is Distrust
of State Courts Most Appropriate?
Though neither Roe nor Griffin mentions this factor, a third element leaps out from both cases. Both involve state judiciaries—
indeed, elected state judiciaries—ruling on disputed elections for
state offices. Indeed, Roe involves the remarkable prospect of the
Alabama Supreme Court potentially deciding who has been validly
73. Id.
74. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1080 (1st Cir. 1978).
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elected to be the next Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court.
Much of the constitutional law of democracy makes the federal judicial role turn on structural circumstances in which other decisionmakers, such as state legislatures, are too strongly self-interested in
the matter at hand to be left free of constitutional oversight. This is
the functional justification the Supreme Court centrally relied on, for
example, when it decided that state legislative districting plans
should be subject to federal constitutional scrutiny.75 As John Hart
Ely famously put it, post-1938 Supreme Court jurisprudence has
found constitutional intervention most readily justified when democratic institutions are potentially compromised and hence to be distrusted with respect to particular issues; much of modern constitutional law treats this distrust as present when democratic institutions are potentially self-interested players in the issue at hand.76
It is hard not to be anxious at the image of an elected state judiciary deciding who has been validly elected its next Chief Justice. If
constitutional law recognizes a general bar against “new law” in the
election context, perhaps the degree to which federal courts aggressively scrutinize such claims should turn—or implicitly does turn—
on the extent to which alternative decisionmakers, such as state
courts, are to be viewed skeptically in light of their potentially compromised position. Such a view would not require a romanticized
view of federal courts as always impartial and detached from these
electoral conflicts; the issue is the more pragmatic one of relative institutional position and relative institutional detachment. That the
Alabama Supreme Court would be a more troubling forum than the
Eleventh Circuit in deciding who holds the highest elective offices in
Alabama, or that the Rhode Island Supreme Court is a potentially
less detached actor than the First Circuit in making rulings that affect the outcome of state and local races, does not seem farfetched. As
I have said, this kind of structural analysis is characteristic of much
of the modern law of democracy.77 Of course, it is unlikely that fed75. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
76. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7577, 101-03 (1980). Looking backward, Ely’s theoretical framework was doctrinally rooted in
Carolene Products, in which the Court itself self-consciously announced that more exacting
judicial scrutiny might be appropriate for legislation which “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected” to provide legitimacy to democratic outcomes.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Looking forward, Ely’s
framework has been extended to suggest a variety of other legal regulations legislators
have used in the past and the present, beyond those recognized in Ely’s work, to seek to
perpetuate their political power—regulations for which similarly exacting judicial scrutiny
is arguably appropriate, though the current Court fails to engage in such scrutiny in these
contexts. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
77. For an extended analysis of the law of democracy in these terms, see Issacharoff &
Pildes, supra note 76.
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eral courts would mention such considerations in their decisions.
Moreover, perhaps this unarticulated posture of distrust is more justifiable for some state election contexts rather than others; Roe affords a powerful example of a context in which such distrust might be
most appropriate.
If the relative structural positions of state and federal courts
ought to play a role in applying the “new law” doctrine, a paradoxical
result would follow. Federal court scrutiny under the “new law” doctrine should be strongest, on this view, in state elections, particularly
those for the highest state offices. For it is here that federal courts
might be thought to have the greatest structural advantage over
state institutions, if reasons do exist for greater skepticism of state
courts in state election contexts. Yet at the same time any such
structural federal-court advantage would dissolve when federal elections are at stake. One need not be more skeptical of federal courts
than state courts when federal elections are involved to believe that
federal courts have no unique structural advantage that would incline them toward greater impartiality in federal elections.78
This structural analysis is merely meant to be suggestive.
Whether it would be sound for federal courts to tighten the screws on
“new law” doctrine depending on their judgment about the relative
impartiality of state actors—either for a category of election contests
or on a (more controversial) context-by-context basis—is a sensitive
proposition. But for current purposes, it is enough to note the distinctly compelling structural context for federal oversight present in
Roe and, to a lesser extent, perhaps also in Griffin. For with this
analysis of the actual and possible underpinnings of the case law in
place, it is now possible to gain some traction in assessing the United
States Supreme Court’s obvious and dominating concern that the
Florida Supreme Court was creating “new law” in the midst of resolving the 2000 election.
VI. BUSH V. GORE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF “NEW LAW”
MORE BROADLY
The pre-Bush v. Gore development, in at least some federal courts,
of constitutional constraints against “new” state election law reveals
a rejection of the strong federalist position that states and local governments should continue to have full autonomy over administration
of state election rules, even for national contests. At the same time,
78. I leave to the side here longstanding debates about whether the general institutional features of federal courts, including lifetime tenure, should be viewed as making
those courts more likely than state courts to decide certain matters more in accord with the
ideals of judging. My focus is on uniquely distinctive features of both federal and state
courts of special relevance in the electoral context.
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this lower court jurisprudence identifies and suggests specific elements necessary to prove that state courts have indeed changed state
law sufficiently to justify the otherwise extraordinary prospect of
federal oversight. The principle against “new law,” therefore, has
been given a rule-bound, circumscribed content in those courts that
have developed it; this rule-bound approach is designed to accommodate the competing interests—in protecting the constitutional dimensions of the right to vote and in protecting the values associated
with decentralized implementation of that right—while doing so in a
way that produces consistent, principled, transparent doctrine. The
Roe-Griffin line of cases shows the greatest willingness among lower
federal courts to enforce “new law” doctrine, and the question now is
how Bush v. Gore compares to the framework for the most aggressive
prior applications of “new law” doctrine. That is, accepting that there
should be some constitutional constraint against new election law,
are the same elements present in Bush v. Gore that justified the most
stringent prior applications of such a doctrine?
Briefly put, the answer is no. Indeed, none of the factors previously necessary to trigger a finding of impermissible “new law” were
present in Bush v. Gore. This in itself does not establish that Bush v.
Gore is wrong in its “new law” concerns. But it does help to pin down
more precisely how idiosyncratic are the conclusions of Justices and
academic commentators that the Florida court made “new law” when
those conclusions are compared to the most aggressive prior applications of this doctrine. Thus, while some have assailed Bush v. Gore
for its willingness to intrude at all into judgments of state law, the
point here is different: even if there are sound constitutional principles that support federal oversight of state rulings on election law,
the specific elements previously thought to justify overturning state
rulings were absent in Bush v. Gore.
The per curiam decision rested on more than just a judgment
about new law, of course; central to the Court’s decision was the substantive and procedural equal protection ruling that different counties could not adopt different standards, in the middle of the recount
process, as to what constitutes a valid vote. The analysis here does
not address those issues.79 But to the extent the threat that Florida
courts were making “new law” loomed over the entire case and influenced not just the concurrence but the general atmosphere in which
Bush v. Gore was heard, the analysis here does suggest how that
sense of threat was untethered to any of the specific elements federal
courts had previously thought to be required to justify concluding
that state courts had unconstitutionally made new election law.
79. The best justification of the Court’s equal protection holding is Einer Elhauge, The
Lessons of Florida 2000, 111 POL’Y REV. 15 (2001-02).
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In the remaining pages, I will quickly suggest why the specific
elements typically present in “new law” cases were absent from the
2000 election litigation.
A. Vote Dilution
As noted above, election contests can arise across a spectrum of
contexts which vary in how firm a basis prior state law and practice
provide for any federal court assessment of whether state court interpretations change that prior law. The presidential election dispute
in Florida arose, it turns out, all the way at one extreme of this spectrum. Florida law provided for the protest and the contest of disputed
elections.80 Yet unlike in Roe or Griffin, nothing comparable in the
prior administrative practice of implementing these laws or in prior
Florida judicial decisions—or in the apparent legislative history and
context of the statutes themselves—could convincingly establish a
clear prior practice or interpretation of the disputed laws. Each side,
of course, argued (as its role required) that the prior law was clear.
But leaving aside the inevitable and interminable debates about how
to read an isolated Florida case or two, the reality is that prior Florida law and practice were not firmly established enough to enable the
current Florida Supreme Court’s decisions to be “objectively” assessed—that is, judged in a way that would generate a high degree of
consensus among legally informed observers. This conclusion is not
surprising in light of several factors.
First, with respect to the actual election laws themselves, there is
little doubt that Florida’s laws simply were not written with a presidential election contest in mind. Even in the frenzy of the litigation
itself, it appeared from the face of these laws that the enacting Florida Legislature had not given a moment’s thought to how the laws
ought to be applied to a presidential election. The presidential election process poses myriad unique issues, not the least of which is the
presence of federally-imposed deadlines that require any vote count
and possible dispute to be resolved by certain dates. A number of
state laws distinguish between processes for contesting state and local elections and the process for contesting a presidential election.
But Florida law (along with that of some other states) makes no such
distinction.81 Since the election, enough time has passed to enable de80. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000), amended by Fla. Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001
Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 42, at 149, 152 (protest); FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (2000), amended by 2001
Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 44, at 149, 153 (contest).
81. See Eric Schickler et al., Safe at Any Speed: Legislative Intent, The Electoral
Count Act of 1887, and Bush v. Gore, 16 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 42,
on file with the Florida State University Law Review). In a 1960 survey, the election contest legislation of nineteen states expressly dealt separately with presidential elections.
Florida was listed as one of seventeen states whose election contest legislation referred
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tailed studies of the legislative background of Florida election law,
including the most recent preelection revision of those laws. These
studies confirm what seemed apparent from the laws themselves: no
evidence has been discovered to suggest that the Florida Legislature
ever thought about the federal election calendar and the relevant
federal statutory provisions, or that the legislature even focused at
all on presidential elections when it wrote or revised the electiondispute laws. When the Florida Legislature enacted these laws, its
sole focus was local and state elections.82
Second, even with respect to the elections the Florida Legislature
did focus on, these laws were still badly drafted and incomplete. They
failed to answer many of the obvious questions such laws need to address. Further, these laws were laced with provisions arguably in
tension with each other—in part, perhaps, because different aspects
of those laws had been enacted in different years. To a greater degree
than judges often admit, these gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities often
form the context in which courts must interpret the law. But as one
who has examined the election laws in many states, I can attest that
even by this lenient standard, Florida’s laws at the time of the 2000
election were among the least well-drafted, least precise in the country.
When inartful laws are not written with specific contexts in mind,
it is hardly surprising if their application to those contexts is uncertain. But incomplete or uncertain state law will often take on more
settled meaning through ongoing applications of that law, which can
occur in administrative or judicial proceedings. Here, however, a
third factor emerged: preexisting Florida administrative and judicial
practice had not contributed to establishing a clear set of resolutions
for the kind of issues that arose in the 2000 election.
Uncontradicted assertions at oral argument before the Florida
Supreme Court stated that the last statewide contest of an election in
Florida had been in 1916 for the Governor’s office83—long before the
current statutes had been enacted. As a result, no clear administrative practice had emerged about issues such as the circumstances for
generally to contests for “any office” or any “public office.” Other states had varying provisions in common law or statutory law. See L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L. REV. 321, 338-39 (1961). The Florida contest of election provision in
2000 simply referred to contesting the election or nomination of “any person to office.” FLA.
STAT. § 102.168(1) (amended 2001).
82. Schickler et al., supra note 81, at 49 (“[A]lthough Florida lawmakers have repeatedly considered and revised their election statutes in recent decades, there is simply no
evidence that legislators were ever mindful of the federal election calendar in general or of
the Electoral Count Act’s safe harbor provision in particular.”).
83. See Full Text of Dec. 7 Florida Supreme Court Hearing, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/nationworld/sns-2000election120700fla
courttext.story.
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statewide races in which recounts were permitted or how they had to
be conducted. Similarly, previous Florida judicial decisions had not
resolved the ambiguities and gaps in these statutes enough to provide determinate guidance—in advance of the 2000 election as to
what meaning these unclear statutes would be given. With respect to
a few issues, isolated decisions were arguably on point, though even
then their implication for statewide issues was unclear. One county
might have adopted a prior standard as to what constituted a valid
vote, and one intermediate appellate court had concluded that undervotes arising from alleged technological errors could not justify a
manual recount.84 But there simply was no well-established, “thick”
body of authoritative state law or administrative practice of significance that bore on the question of how Florida applied these disputed-election statutes to a statewide election contest.
Contrast this with the “new law” situations in Roe I and Griffin.
In Roe, the district court found, after a three-day factual trial, that
for at least the fifteen preceding years, the consistent, actual practice
of sixty-six of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties had been to exclude the
specific kind of absentee ballot at issue there.85 In addition, the “consistent and plain”86 position of the Secretary of State, which had been
communicated in writing to every voting official in the state, had always been that absentee ballots of the kind in dispute had to be excluded. As the District Court put it, this had been a “bright-line rule”
in Alabama.87 Similarly, in Griffin, the court of appeals found that
the ballots in dispute had been treated as valid ballots according to
“long-standing practice;” that state officials charged with running the
election had presented the ballots as valid to voters; that the Secretary of State considered the ballots valid; and that the divided state
supreme court decision stood in the face of these longstanding practices and formal administrative interpretations and actions.88
No record of this sort came close to existing in Florida. Indeed, one
might hazard the view that any of the state judicial bodies that became involved in the litigation, including the Florida Supreme Court,
would have been more than pleased had the prior law or election
practice been more clearly settled than it was. Few judges, I suspect,
would relish having themselves and their institutions thrust into a
84. On the existence of prior established counting rules, see, for example, POSNER,
supra note 10, at 122 (stating that particular rule was “followed by the Palm Beach canvassing board in previous elections”). For an example of the use of the appellate case, see
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Broward County
Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (contending that Florida law
does not require “the counting of improperly marked ballots”)).
85. Roe v. Mobile County Appointing Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 1995).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1076 (1st Cir. 1978).

718

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:691

national arena on the most partisan of issues; most judges might well
hope that the prior law would be clear enough to insulate them from
an almost inevitable firestorm of criticism that would result whichever way they would rule. But despite all the litigation, none of the
lawyers on either side appeared able to establish a clear Florida administrative or judicial practice on many of the disputed issues.
Moreover, the concurring U.S. Supreme Court Justices who concluded that the Florida Supreme Court had unconstitutionally created new law were also unable to support this judgment by pointing
to the kinds of records or facts or patterns of practice that had been
present in Roe and Griffin. And the academic commentary that has
endorsed Bush v. Gore on the grounds that the Florida Supreme
Court decisions violated Article II—essentially, the grounds that that
court had created “new law”—has similarly offered no wellestablished set of administrative practices or judicial rulings in Florida that would provide a firm baseline against which to measure the
Florida Supreme Court’s decisions. To be sure, critics and supporters
of Bush v. Gore wave individual past decisions around from which
they argue that prior law favored one side or the other. But both
sides are required to make inferences, at best, from isolated decisions
that do not directly address the specific practices at issue in any way
comparable to the kind of firmly anchored baselines present in Roe
and Griffin.
The dispute between the United States Supreme Court and the
Florida Supreme Court thus could not boil down to anything other
than a dispute over how to read the bare state election statutes
themselves. Realistically, unlike in Roe and Griffin, no robust and
meaningful evidence, external to the texts of those statutes, could
enable federal court oversight of state court interpretation to rest on
anything other than the statutory texts. At this point, federal and
state courts can engage only in a head-on debate about how best to
read these texts as texts—texts which were poorly drafted from the
start and were not written with a presidential election in mind. No
doubt, different judges and courts would come to different conclusions on many of the unsettled and ambiguous issues in Florida’s
election laws. But framed within the broader perspective of constitutional constraints on new election law, the question is whether federal courts should play a role at all in judging state court interpretations in the specific context in which federal court “oversight” of state
institutions can be based on little more than disagreement about how
best to read the bare texts of state laws.
Let us accept that the Constitution should constrain state courts
from developing “new law” in the guise of interpreting existing law.
The question, then, is not whether it is inappropriate for federal
courts ever to intrude on the rulings of state courts about their own
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election laws. In striking the balance between the national constitutional interests at stake and the values associated with decentralized
control over elections, the important question becomes how strong
and convincing the evidence ought to be before federal courts should
hold state court interpretation equivalent to unconstitutional manipulation—manipulation being, in essence, what the “new law” doctrine was designed to guard against. That is the question too quickly
overlooked in disputes between those who assert that states should
retain full control of the meaning of their election laws and those who
are prepared to turn their disagreement with the Florida Supreme
Court’s reading of state law into a justification for United States Supreme Court intervention. The pre-Bush v. Gore “new law” constitutional doctrine had developed to try to avoid either of these extremes
and to accommodate the competing concerns behind the right to vote,
on the one hand, and state decisionmaking, on the other.
Recall that, under that doctrine, state decisions had to constitute
an “abominable” change in state practice in order to justify “extraordinary” federal constitutional intervention. Such federal intervention
was necessary to ensure that no “patent and fundamental unfairness” was present that rose to the level of a federal constitutional violation. But when federal courts lack any firm anchor in a clear set of
established prior practices, the central evidence of any purported
change in state law can only be the text of the relevant statutes
themselves and arguments about how best to interpret them. Should
federal courts play a role at all in assessing state decisions when
there is no evidence on which to anchor that judgment other than the
very statutes being interpreted? Recall also that the purpose behind
the factors identified to justify federal intervention in the prior “new
law” cases was to protect national interests in the “fundamental fairness” of elections but, at the same time, to avoid turning every disputed state election law ruling into a federal constitutional question.
Yet if mere disagreement about how best to read the text of state
laws can be transformed into a constitutional issue, every dispute
about state election law is indeed capable, in principle, of being
turned into fodder for constitutional law.
Judge Richard Posner has mounted the most sustained academic
defense of Bush v. Gore.89 Doctrinally, he is prepared to defend the
decision only on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court did indeed change prior state election law; he rejects the per curiam’s alternative ground that the recount process violated equal protection.
89. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 10; Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon
to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Reply to
Friedman, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 871 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and
Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 1 (2000).
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But the tepid crescendo of Judge Posner’s defense is only that
“[r]easonable judges could conclude that the Florida supreme court
had so far disregarded the law as to violate [the Constitution.]”90 And
Judge Posner acknowledges that this “is a difficult issue.”91 Even if
Judge Posner is right, the more pressing question should be whether
that is enough. If competing interpretations of state election law are
reasonable, should the federal system be structured so that federal
courts have the power to make their interpretations prevail, when
they have no more basis on which to condemn state courts than contrary views about how best to interpret legal texts? Certainly Roe
and Griffin presented something considerably more compelling.
Given the detailed evidence established in those cases, most federal
judges would surely have concluded that state courts had changed
state law. But that is a far different standard of proof than the one
upon which Judge Posner’s “new law” defense of Bush v. Gore relies.92
When potential conflicts between federal and state courts come
down to little more than how best to read statutory texts—
particularly those replete with seeming gaps and ambiguities—the
difference in interpretation will frequently amount to a philosophical
difference over how courts should generally go about interpreting
statutes. This classic jurisprudential problem is one to which the
American legal system does not offer any general answer. Put simplistically, two polar positions can be identified: purposive versus
textual interpretation. In the former, courts conceive themselves to
be in partnership with the legislature; the role of courts is to discover, as best as possible, the general purposes for which laws have
been passed and then to further those purposes through acts of interpretation in cases where the statute’s reach is otherwise unclear.
Courts that emphasize textual interpretation, by contrast, tend to
see themselves less as legislative partners and more as faithful
agents; such courts view the legislature to have expressed its purpose
through the text of the statute itself. The court’s role is to apply the
text according to its terms. With purposive interpretation, courts
take an active role in seeking to harmonize statutory schemes as a
90. Electronic Dialogue from Judge Richard A. Posner to Professor Alan M. Dershowitz, supra note 9.
91. Id.
92. Ultimately, Judge Posner would defend the result in Bush v. Gore on pragmatic,
rather than doctrinal, grounds. His central argument is that the consequences of allowing
the election dispute to continue would have been bad enough for the country that the Court
should have terminated that dispute for that reason, as long as there were some plausible
constitutional footing for doing so. My own view, based on the Court’s pattern of decisions
in other cases involving the structure of democratic processes, is that pragmatic reasons of
this sort likely did play a more important role than doctrinal considerations in Bush v.
Gore. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001).
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whole, or to fill in gaps and ambiguities according to judicial judgments about the underlying legislative purpose. With textual interpretation, courts hew as closely as possible to the specific terms of
the written text, without further judgments about whether direct
textual application appears to advance what the courts view as the
legislature’s underlying objectives.
Which of these views prevailed in American law before the 2000
election? Neither. There was no clearly established prior law, at the
general methodological level, regarding how statutes ought to be interpreted. Rather, the answer has varied both over time and between
different courts within our radically decentralized system of legal authority. Purposive methods, for example, more or less dominated
within the United States Supreme Court from the 1950s to the
1980s. Since then, certain Justices have argued strongly for textual
interpretation. That textual approach has gained strength in recent
years, though the Court is now internally divided on these questions.
The answer also varies throughout the American legal system; this is
not the kind of question on which the Supreme Court can impose a
uniform approach on all courts. Nor can it be said that the general
intellectual culture of law in the United States, today, generally endorses one of these methods to the exclusion of the other.
Faced with ineptly drafted election laws, the Florida Supreme
Court took what it considered a purposive approach and sought to
adapt a statutory scheme, written with only state and local recounts
in mind, to the context of a presidential election. As far as I can tell,
this Florida Supreme Court regularly engages in purposive interpretation of statutes, in election and many other cases. On the other
hand, several members of the United States Supreme Court fervently
believe it is precisely these open-ended methods of purposive interpretation that allow courts to impose their own views of desired outcomes on statutory schemes; for that reason, these Justices strongly
embrace textual interpretation. It is these Justices who focused their
constitutional rejection (based technically on Article II, Section 1 of
the United States Constitution) of the Florida court’s decision on the
latter court’s statutory interpretations. So vehement were these textually committed Supreme Court Justices—Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas—that they excoriated the Florida
Supreme Court in the most disparaging rhetoric: the Florida court’s
readings were “absurd,” ones “[n]o reasonable person” would endorse,
and “plainly departed from the legislative scheme.”93 From a textualist’s perspective, purposive interpreters regularly depart from the
legislative scheme; it is in the very nature of purposive interpretation
to do so. At the same time, these critical Supreme Court Justices do
93. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 118-19 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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regularly demand fidelity to legislative text as text: their textualism
also applies across different statutory contexts. To the extent the Supreme Court majority viewed the Florida Supreme Court as a runaway court,94 much of that belief might ultimately have stemmed
from fundamentally different philosophies of statutory interpretation—philosophies the concurring Supreme Court Justices and the
Florida Supreme Court majority each apply with some consistency,
yet which differ radically from each other.
In sum, new election law has previously been held to become unconstitutional vote dilution only when prior state practice had established a firm baseline against which the claim of new law could be
tested. In Bush v. Gore, by contrast, the dispute over “new law” essentially came down to a dispute over how to read the bare statutory
text alone. Any such dispute will implicate philosophical views about
proper methods of statutory interpretation, views that may differ
across courts, though any one court might consistently adhere to a
particular approach. The central question about a “new law” defense
of Bush v. Gore is whether these kinds of differences—over how to
read statutes when their meaning is not previously settled in fairly
unequivocal ways, as in Roe and Griffin—should provide enough of a
basis to justify federal court overturning of state court interpretations of state law.
B. Detrimental Reliance
Detrimental reliance of individual voters on the “prior” law is either necessary or sufficient in the Roe-Griffin line for arguable
changes in state law to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
In the legal sense, this detrimental reliance has a specific meaning:
voters who relied on the purported prior state of the law would (or
might) have acted differently had they known that law not to be correct. There is no basis I can see for finding such detrimental reliance
in Bush v. Gore, even assuming that any of the Florida Supreme
Court rulings “changed” the state’s prior election laws. Recall the
kind of legal rulings at issue: whether to permit manual recounts absent a showing of machine error; whether to count as valid ballots
that had been marked in particular ways; whether to permit
amended returns from selective hand recounts to be included in the
precertification vote totals; and whether to permit a postcertification
contest of an election which involved extensive hand recounts of “undervoted” ballots across numerous counties.
Whatever else might be said about these decisions, if they do constitute a change of law, they do not do so in a way that would impli94. David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
737, 751-55 (2001).
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cate detrimental reliance on the part of voters comparable to that in
Roe and Griffin. Would any voters be able to claim plausibly that had
they known the Florida Supreme Court would have authorized hand
recounts, those voters would have acted in some different way—
somehow changed their voting practices? Take the much disputed issue of what constituted a valid vote on a punch-card ballot: a claim of
detrimental reliance would amount to voters asserting that, had they
known they could get a vote counted without fully punching out the
chad on a punch-card ballot, they would have done so. That any voter
who did not vote could plausibly claim, as in Griffin, that they would
have turned out at the polls had they only known a partially punched
chad would be treated as a valid vote seems implausible. And that
voters who did the work required to punch out the actual chad could
claim that their constitutional reliance interests were violated because they had to do more work than state law turned out actually to
require is just as implausible. The same seems true of the other issues in dispute. Because those disputes involved relatively obscure
issues of the vote counting and recount process, it is hard to imagine
that any voters or nonvoters structured their conduct around existing
law and would have been likely to act differently had they known the
law would emerge as it did from the Florida Supreme Court.
Detrimental reliance, in the legal sense recognized in Roe and
Griffin, and more generally throughout the law, is not an abstract
expectation, hope, or desire that the law remain the same. In the
election context, the claim requires a more concrete and tangible effect than that voters had voted in reliance on a fair election system,
and that the courts were depriving them of that expectation by
changing the rules of the game through “new law” creation. The concept requires a specific change of position in reliance on the existing
law, a change of position that would not have been made had the actor known the law to be different. In the election context, individual
voters would have to be able to establish that the courts had retroactively changed the election process in a way to which those voters
would have self-protectively responded ex ante had they known of
the change in advance. Whatever the merits of the Florida court decisions, I cannot see any plausible claim of detrimental reliance,
based on the purported prior state of the law, that would be legally
recognizable. Despite the centrality of detrimental reliance in the
lower courts, Bush v. Gore did not purport to show that such reliance
had been present in Florida; Bush v. Gore did not address the relevance of detrimental reliance at all.
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C. Structural Considerations and Relative Institutional Distrust
I have speculated that, as a descriptive matter, lower federal
courts might implicitly be most aggressive in scrutinizing claims of
“new law” in cases in which the federal courts have most reason to be
wary of the structural position of state courts vis-á-vis the election at
issue (compared to the position of the federal courts). This distrust
might be greatest when the election involves the state supreme court
itself, as in Roe; or perhaps for other high state offices as well; or
perhaps most expansively, for any state or local office. Normatively,
such a view would be consistent with much of the theoretical underpinnings for the constitutional role of federal courts in overseeing
democratic processes more generally. If there are convincing functional reasons that federal courts systematically are more likely than
state courts on certain types of elections to bring the desired detachment to bear, such reasons could support more active application of
the “new law” doctrine. Structural considerations of this sort were
transparently at work in the two “new law” cases from outside the
election context upon which the concurrence in Bush v. Gore relied;95
both arose out of the early civil rights movement in which the state
supreme courts involved, from Alabama and South Carolina, had
proven to be systematically hostile, like their state legislatures of the
era, over a series of cases to civil rights claims.
If structural analysis of this sort ought to play a role in “new law”
cases, the crucial consideration must be whether state courts can be
deemed systematically compromised or disadvantaged with respect to
the relevant election law issues. The point of taking this consideration into account—like taking vote dilution or detrimental reliance
into account—is to find some place to stand, outside the context of
the specific case at issue, from which a principled and consistent federal court judgment of new law can justifiably be made. If federal
courts can conclude on an ad hoc basis that a particular state court
should be distrusted on the particular issue at hand, the point of invoking structural considerations would largely be defeated. Federal
courts can appropriately be objects of distrust too. If structural considerations are to play a role in justifying federal oversight of state
courts, federal courts must be able to point to a pattern broader than
the particular case at issue to justify the implicit or explicit claim
that they are better positioned than state courts to provide detached
judgment.
Whether these considerations do or should play any role in cases
like Roe and Griffin is unclear. But either way, structural analysis of
95. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958)).
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this sort would not support an aggressive approach to “new law”
claims in Bush v. Gore. Charges of partisanship swirled around virtually every actor who touched upon any of the issues in this, the
most politically explosive of all electoral issues; such charges will inevitably arise in contexts this incendiary—which does not make them
wrong but does make them unavoidable. But there is no general
structural reason to think that federal courts, or the United States
Supreme Court, are better positioned than the state courts to have a
comparative institutional advantage that would predictably make
them less prone to the appearance or reality of partisan pressures or
temptations. Bush v. Gore did not involve the Alabama Supreme
Court deciding who had been validly elected Chief Justice to that
court. There are no structural reasons to think that the United
States Supreme Court would be any less “interested,” in the pejorative sense, than the Florida courts in the outcome of the presidential
election. Indeed, some have pressed all the way to the opposite conclusion: they have argued that the United States Supreme Court
necessarily has a greater potential conflict of interest in the outcome,
because the President of the United States will not be appointing
Justices to the Florida Supreme Court.96 But one need not view the
United States Supreme Court as more “interested” in the outcome to
recognize that no structural reasons militate in favor of designing
doctrine on the assumption the Court would be less interested. The
structural considerations that might justify greater skepticism of
state courts for certain state elections are not present when the
Presidency of the United States is at stake. To the extent that such
considerations do or should play a role in federal court application of
the “new law” doctrine, Bush v. Gore cannot persuasively invoke such
considerations. Here too, Bush v. Gore did not purport to do so,
though the lower courts have also not expressly relied upon such factors either. But if the Roe-Griffin line is best justified in part because
such factors were present there, those factors were not present in
Bush v. Gore.

96. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001,
available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/3/ackerman-b.html. Judge Posner, though a
defender of the decision, states that the interest of Supreme Court Justices in who their
colleagues will be, and hence who the President will be, “will forever cast a shadow over
Bush v. Gore.” Electronic Dialogue from Judge Richard A. Posner to Professor Alan M.
Dershowitz, supra note 9. Judge Posner argues that this would have been true had the decision come out the other way. But it is precisely the inevitability of such potential conflicts
that underlie arguments that the Supreme Court should have stayed out of the dispute
and left Congress to resolve the contest. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637 (2001).
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D. “New Law” and Article II of the Constitution
I have written about “new law” as a general legal concept (in the
election context). Doctrinally, those lower courts that have developed
and applied the concept have done so through the Fourteenth
Amendment, under either the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses. As we have seen, concerns about the possible creation of
“new law” were pervasive in the United States Supreme Court’s
questions, in its formal opinions in the election litigation, and in
much of the academic defense of Bush v. Gore. These concerns are reflected in certain aspects of the Court’s equal protection holding;
other aspects of that holding do not depend on any judgment that the
Florida courts had changed state law. To the extent that judgments
about “new law” play a role in Bush v. Gore through the Equal Protection Clause, the analysis here applies directly. I have been comparing how “new law” is treated as a matter of equal protection law
in the federal courts most willing to overturn state election decisions
and in the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.
But in Bush v. Gore, the problem of “new law” also arose under
another doctrinal heading. The concurrence relied on Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution in holding that the Florida Supreme Court
had, in effect, changed state law.97 The question, then, is whether the
concept of “new law” should be understood and applied differently
under Article II than under the Equal Protection Clause. In particular, should or do the Article II, Section 1 provisions justify a greater
federal court willingness to find “new law” than do the general provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment?
I cannot see why that would be so. Those who draw on Article II
rely overwhelmingly—indeed, exclusively, I think it is fair to say—on
a literal reading of the text of Article II. That text empowers each
state to appoint presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”98 If this text had been designed to give federal courts a distinct and more aggressive role in overseeing state
court election law decisions, those purposes could justify a different
way of identifying “new law” for Article II purposes than for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Or if the Article II text had a history of
being applied to authorize greater federal court oversight of state
election law rulings, that might also support a different approach
under Article II than under the Fourteenth Amendment. But nothing
extrinsic to the literal text of Article II itself has come to light thus
far to support such a position. Indeed, nothing in the original history
of Article II, or in the history of how those provisions have been understood over time, or in the United States Supreme Court decisions
97. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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in the 2000 election litigation, or in the academic commentary supportive of the concurrence that has emerged since those decisions,
points to substantial evidence, outside the text itself, for the view
that Article II was knowingly and purposively designed or previously
applied to support a more aggressive federal court stance toward
claims of “new law” under Article II than under the Equal Protection
Clause. The most extensive defense of Bush v. Gore on Article II
grounds is Judge Posner’s; but Judge Posner candidly admits that no
reason exists to assert that Article II was designed to authorize a distinct federal court role in policing state courts in the presidential
election context: “It is true that there is no evidence that the choice of
this word [legislature] (rather than simply of ‘state’) was deliberate,
or that the framers of the Constitution foresaw the use of Article II to
limit the scope of state judicial intervention in the selection of a
state’s electors.”99 Actually, however, the case is worse than this: the
evidence that has emerged is to the contrary.
The most detailed investigation into the history of Article II appears in this symposium issue, in Hayward H. Smith’s article.100
Smith is in accord with Posner that there is no evidence from the
Constitutional Convention or the state ratifying conventions that any
thought was given, one way or the other, as to whether the word “legislature” in Article II was designed to impose distinct and special
constraints on state court interpretation of presidential elector
laws.101 But there is historical practice about how this provision was
actually understood and applied, and that evidence does not support
the view that state legislatures were any more “independent” when
acting under Article II than they were when acting pursuant to authority delegated to them elsewhere in the Constitution.
Thus, the founding generation treated state constitutional provisions that authorized gubernatorial vetoes to apply to state legislation under Article II just as much as to any other state law. In addition, state constitutions determined how state legislatures were empowered to appoint presidential electors (as well as Senators, despite
the text of the original Article I, Section 3, which empowered “the
Legislature thereof” from each State to choose Senators). Thus, as a
matter of historical practice, state legislatures were not understood
at the time to be more “independent” by virtue of Article II of the

99. Electronic Dialogue between Judge Richard A. Posner and Professor Alan M. Dershowitz, supra note 9 (Monday, July 9). In his book, Judge Posner puts the point a bit less
directly. POSNER, supra note 10, at 156 (“The interpretation that I am suggesting is not
compelled by case law, legislative history, or constitutional language. But neither is it
blocked by any of these conventional interpretive guides.”).
100. See Hayward H. Smith, The History of the Article II Independent State Legislature
Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2001).
101. Id. at 741.
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constraints and conditions on their power than they were when acting pursuant to any other source of authority. Nor has the seemingly
comparable language of Article I, Section 4 ever been interpreted to
authorize distinct and more aggressive federal court oversight of
state court interpretations of laws regulating other national elections, such as for the United States House of Representatives.102
This is not the place for a full analysis of Article II. I rely on
Smith’s detailed work and the absence in the Bush v. Gore concurrence or academic commentary defending that concurrence of any
evidence, to date at least, of original purposes or historical practices
under Article II that would rebut Smith’s findings. More importantly,
I am not arguing for the maximalist view that Article II does not authorize any federal court oversight of state courts in the presidential
election context. I am only arguing that it is appropriate, if federal
courts are to do so under Article II, to look by analogy at how federal
courts have defined “new law” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
Absent any specific purpose behind Article II or historical practice
applying it that would give any concrete content to the concept of
“new law”—or, put in institutional terms, to the boundary between
state legislatures and state courts—we will have to provide that content through theoretical analysis of how the concept of “new law”
ought to be understood. That requires accommodating the competing
concerns at stake: the values associated with the modern, constitutionalized right to vote and the values of decentralized control over
election regulation. That analysis also requires defining the justifications that motivate the need for such a concept and determining how
courts should identify when new election law has been created
impermissibly.
All those considerations transcend the specific constitutional provisions involved, whether that provision is the Fourteenth Amendment or Article II. Thus, it seems appropriate to compare how federal
courts have identified “new law” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes and how individual Justices in Bush v. Gore identified “new
law.” Viewed against this deeper background of federal court practice, any “new law” defense of Bush v. Gore—as in the concurrence, in
most academic commentary that has supported the Court’s result,
and in aspects of the per curiam—would entail a balder disagreement about how to read the bare words of election-law texts than any
federal court has previously relied upon to justify the judgment that
a state court has “changed the rules in the middle of the game” dur-

102. Article I, Section 4 provides “The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof. . . .” The leading precedent on this provision is Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355
(1932).
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ing an election dispute. I know of no instance in which a federal court
has previously “convicted” a state court of such a change without that
conviction resting on a far more firmly anchored baseline of past
state law and practice than anything that was present in the 2000
election litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Defenders of America’s extraordinarily decentralized voting system criticize Bush v. Gore for its nationalist and centralized intrusion
on the state regulation of elections, even when that state regulation
takes the form of state court interpretation of state election law. This
“federalist” critique, taken in its strongest form, argues that neither
constitutional law nor sound principle licenses federal courts to decide whether state courts are making new law in the context of resolving election contests. I take James Gardner to be defending a position along these lines in his contribution to this symposium.103 But
pushed that far, the position ought to raise concerns, at the least,
when it comes to national elections. The reaction of foreign observers
to the 2000 election may perhaps reveal something of the peculiarity
of this strong federalist position. Having learned how dramatically
localized electoral processes are for national office in the United
States, these commentators find our decentralization hard to explain
on anything other than historical, rather than functional, grounds.
Thus, Shlomo Avineri, an Israeli political scientist, points out that
most democratic countries have a National Election Commission, in
some form, that seeks to ensure uniformity of processes for national
elections.104 Similarly, Justice Nöelle Lenoir points out that in
France, all presidential elections are regulated and “subject to permanent vigilant monitoring” by a single entity, the Constitutional
Council (Lenoir was formerly a Justice on the Council); this appointed body, designed to be independent, has exclusive power to
regulate and resolve controversies over presidential elections in
France.105 Of course these perspectives have no direct bearing on the
legal allocation of power between national and state institutions in
the United States. But they do provide a comparative vantage point
on how unusual it would be to have no national institutional oversight of election contests for national office.
Even before Bush v. Gore, United States constitutional law did not
embrace such an extreme position. Due in part to the age of our Con-

103. Gardner, supra note 1.
104. Shlomo Avineri, A Flawed Yet Resilient System: A View From Jerusalem, in THE
LONGEST NIGHT, supra note 15 (manuscript at 8, on file with the Florida State University
Law Review).
105. Lenoir, supra note 15, at 37.
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stitution, we do not have the intermediate institutions, such as National Election Commissions, that oversee democracy in many more
recently created constitutional democracies. Instead, federal courts
have provided a degree of that oversight since the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s began to recognize national constitutional
interests associated with voting and the design of America’s democratic institutions. Constitutional law has, therefore, been a major
source for some degree of the nationalization that one might expect
for determining the ground rules of national democratic processes. In
accord with these constitutional (and therefore national) interests,
some federal courts had closely scrutinized state courts to ensure
they were not making “new law” when resolving election disputes.
But even the most aggressive of these federal courts had sought to
circumscribe this scrutiny by identifying specific, narrow, and precisely defined circumstances in which such scrutiny was justified.
This Essay has not addressed the equal protection holding of Bush v.
Gore. But I have tried to provide perspective, from within the voting
rights field, on previous resolutions of disputes over whether state
courts had created “new law” in election contexts. To the extent that
aspects of Bush v. Gore—the decision or the debate about the decision—rest on the judgment that Florida’s courts had created “new
law,” the prior law of voting rights suggests just how exceptional any
such judgment would be.

